

Message Text

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FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM NATO NOV 29:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 6512

FOR EUR/RPM

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, NAC

SUBJECT: CSCE: REPORT ON PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE

REF: A) USNATO 6481, B) USNATO 6476, C) STATE 286289

1. THERE FOLLOWS FINAL TEXT OF C-M(76)76, REPORT ON PREPARATIONS FOR BLEGRADE 1977 CSCE MEETINGS, WHICH NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) WILL DISCUSS AT ITS DECEMBER 1 MEETING. WE ARE SENDING BY SEPTELS: (A) FINAL TEXT OF REPORT ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION; AND (B) SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR USE AT DECEMBER 1 NAC.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE PREPARATIONS FOR THE BELGRADE MEETINGS, 1977

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL

FURTHER TO THE COUNCIL'S DECISION AT ITS MEETING ON 1ST OCTOBER, 1975, I ATTACH A REPORT ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE

BELGRADE MEETINGS, 1977, WHICH IS ONE OF TWO PARTS OF THE THIRD REPORT OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE.

2. THE OTHER PART OF THE THIRD REPORT, A REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION DURING THE PERIOD SINCE 10TH MAY, 1976, IS BEING CIRCULATED AS C-M(76)73.

3. PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE ATTACHED REPORT DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE MOST IMPORTANT POINTS ON WHICH THE COUNCIL MAY WISH TO CONCENTRATE ITS DISCUSSIONS, AND PARAGRAPH 3 CONTAINS A RECOMMENDATION.

4. THE COUNCIL WILL BE CONSIDERING BOTH PARTS OF THE THIRD REPORT AT ITS MEETING ON 1ST DECEMBER, WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF MINISTERS.
(SIGNED) JOSEPH M.A.H. LUNS

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE
THIRD REPORT BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
(10TH MAY, 1976 TO 25TH NOVEMBER, 1976)

PREPARATIONS FOR THE BELGRADE MEETINGS, 1977
INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION

1. AT ITS MEETING ON 1ST OCTOBER, 1975 THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT A REPORT ON THOSE ASPECTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE WHICH HAVE A PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE COULD BE PREPARED BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. IN AGREEING ON 23RD JUNE, 1976 THAT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD PREPARE A FURTHER FOLLOW-ON REPORT, THE COUNCIL NOTED THAT, AS THE TIME FOR CONVENING THE 1977 BELGRADE MEETINGS APPROACHED, THEY WOULD WISH TO DEVOTE INCREASING ATTENTION TO THE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS. THIS REPORT DEALS WITH THOSE PREPARATIONS.

2. THE MOST IMPORTANT POINTS ON WHICH THE COUNCIL
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MAY WISH TO CONCENTRATE ITS DISCUSSION ARE THE FOLLOWING:

(I) FINAL POLICY DECISIONS WILL ONLY BE TAKEN BY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS NEARER TO THE BELGRADE MEETINGS, SO THAT THE OVERALL STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS CAN BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. MEANWHILE THE COUNCIL MAY WISH TO EXAMINE THE POLICY OPTIONS AND TO INDICATE INITIAL BROAD GUIDELINES
(PARAGRAPH 4).

(II) THE MEETINGS SHOULD BE USED TO ENDEAVOUR TO DEVELOP EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN DIRECTIONS DESIRED BY WESTERN COUNTRIES, AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, TO ENCOURAGE EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE FINAL ACT. IT WILL ALSO BE NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINIONS THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS ARE UNDERTAKING A REALISTIC REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AND WORKING FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. A BALANCE WILL HAVE TO BE STRUCK BETWEEN THE TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE VARIOUS AIMS IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME (PARAGRAPHS 6-8, 11-12).

(III) THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BE THE CENTRAL TASK OF THE MAIN MEETING. IT SHOULD BE FULL, FRANK AND OBJECTIVE, RECOGNIZING BOTH THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND THE GAPS. THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT SEEK A CONFRONTATION, BUT SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR SOME FORCEFUL REACTIONS FROM EASTERN DELEGATIONS. SUCH A REVIEW SHOULD COVER THE IMPLEMENTATION BY INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES (PARAGRAPHS 13-16).

(IV) WESTERN ATTITUDE TO NEW PROPOSALS (A) TO IMPLEMENT EXISTING PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT AND (B) TO DEVELOP THOSE PROVISIONS: IT IS DESIRABLE FOR THE ALLIES TO APPEAR POSITIVE AND THEY SHOULD NOT LEAVE THE INITIATIVE ENTIRELY TO OTHERS; BUT THERE ARE DANGERS INHERENT IN SUPPORTING OR TABLING NEW PROPOSALS, AND CAUTION IS NEEDED. FOR THESE REASONS THE ALLIES SHOULD PREPARE A LIMITED NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS BUT LEAVE THE DECISION ON THEIR CONFIDENTIAL

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USE UNTIL LATER (PARAGRAPHS 17-20).

(V) WESTERN ATTITUDE TO FURTHER FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS: IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR THE ALLIES TO AGREE TO A NEW "HELSINKI" CONFERENCE; BUT, IF THE BELGRADE MEETINGS PROVE SATISFACTORY, THE ALLIES COULD AGREE THAT A FURTHER MEETING, AS PROVIDED FOR IN PRINCIPLE IN THE FINAL ACT, WOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER 2/3 YEARS. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES INHERENT IN ENCOURAGING NEW PROPOSALS (SEE (IV)) APPLY ALSO TO EXPERTS MEETINGS: SOME MAY BE WORTHWHILE BUT CAUTION IS AGAIN REQUIRED (PARAGRAPHS 21-24).

(VI) WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD CONDUCT AN ACTIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY (PARAGRAPHS 29-30).

RECOMMENDATION

3. THE COUNCIL MAY WISH TO ENDORSE THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS.

4. IT WOULD SEEM NECESSARY TO VIEW THE POLITICS AND TACTICS FOR THE BELGRADE MEETINGS WITHIN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF THE

PROCESS OF DETENTE. THE MEETINGS WILL HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND CONVERSELY, THE GENERAL STATE OF THOSE RELATIONS AT THE TIME WILL, TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT, DETERMINE THE POSITIONS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AT THE MEETINGS. IT WOULD APPEAR, THEREFORE, THAT FINAL POSITIONS ON POLICIES SHOULD BE FORMULATED ONLY NEARER THE TIME OF THE MEETINGS, AT THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL IN MAY 1977. MEANWHILE, ALL THE OPTIONS WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED. THE COUNCIL MAY NOW WISH TO INDICATE BROAD INITIAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WITHIN WHICH THE PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE PURSUED.

MANDAT OF MEETINGS

5. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT LAYS DOWN THAT A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WILL BE HELD IN BELGRADE IN 1977, AND THAT A PREPARATORY MEETING WILL CONVENE ON 15TH JUNE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT, THE MAIN MEETING WILL EXCHANGE VIEWS ON:

(A) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT;

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(B) DEEPENING OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IN THE FUTURE;

(C) FURTHER FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS.

GENERAL AIMS AT BELGRADE

6. ALTHOUGH IT IS TOO EARLY TO KNOW THE GENERAL APPROACH OF ALLIED COUNTRIES AT THE BELGRADE MEETINGS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY CERTAIN GENERAL OBJECTIVES WHICH SHOULD STILL BE VALID AT THE TIME OF THE MEETINGS, UNLESS THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGES CONSIDERABLY.

7. THE BELGRADE MEETINGS SHOULD BE APPROACHED BY WESTERN COUNTRIES IN A POSITIVE MANNER AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE THEIR OWN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. WITHIN THE OVERALL AIM OF PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS ON LINES DESIRED BY THE WEST, THE MEETINGS SHOULD BE USED BY WESTERN COUNTRIES TO EMPHASIZE THEIR CONCEPT OF DETENTE (ESPECIALLY THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS "CONTENU CONCRET") AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, TO ENCOURAGE EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT. IT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINIONS THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS ARE UNDERTAKING A REALISTIC REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ARE WORKING FOR PROGRESS. THESE AIMS TO SOME EXTENT POINT IN DIFFERENT TACTICAL DIRECTIONS- IN SOME CASES TO A LOW KEY APPROACH, IN OTHER A HIGH KEY. A BALANCE WILL HAVE TO BE STRUCK AT THE POINT WHERE THESE AIMS CAN BEST BE COMBINED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME.

8. WHILE THE BELGRADE MEETINGS PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES TO THE WEST, THEY ALSO PRESENT DIFFICULTIES (SEE, FOR EXAMPLE,

PARAGRAPHS 9, 13, 16, 18, 22, 24 AND 25). IN PARTICULAR WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL NEED TO GUARD AGAINST ANY MOVES WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE UNITY, BALANCE AND AUTHORITY OF THE FINAL ACT OR ANY ATTEMPTS TO REINTERPRET ITS PROVISIONS.

9. EASTERN COUNTRIES APPEAR TO WISH THE BELGRADE MEETINGS TO CONCENTRATE MAINLY ON GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE, AND ARE CONCERNED TO AVOID THEM BECOMING A TRIBUNAL ON IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCES. NEVERTHELESS, THEY SEEM TO HAVE REALIZED THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL INSIST ON THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION
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BEING A SERIOUS EXERCISE. EASTERN COUNTRIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO GO ON TO THE ATTACK THEMSELVES IN CRITICISING WESTERN PERFORMANCES. THEY ARE LIKELY TO WORK FOR AN OUTCOME WHICH WILL MINIMIZE PRESSURE ON THEM FOR MEANINGFUL IMPLEMENTATION AND DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM THOSE AREAS OF THE FINAL ACT OF SPECIAL DIFFICULTY FOR THEM. THEY WILL NOT BE IN THE POSITION OF "DEMANDEURS" TO THE SAME EXTENT AS THEY WERE AT THE HELSINKI/ GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, AND MAY WELL PROVE LESS READY TO COMPROMISE. HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AT THE TIME, THEY ARE LIKELY TO WANT THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT TO EMPHASIZE THE MERITS OF DETENTE, AS WELL AS WANTING SOME PROGRESS ON THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS; AND THIS SHOULD SOMEWHAT STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN NEGOTIATION HAND.

10. THE AIMS OF THE NEUTRALS AND, TO SOME EXTENT, THE NON-ALIGNED, WILL PROBABLY BE CLOSE TO THOSE OF WESTERN COUNTRIES.

11. THE CHARACTER OF THE DETENTE PROCESS WILL INEVITABLY BE REFERRED TO FREQUENTLY DURING THE BELGRADE DISCUSSIONS. THE ALLIES WILL WISH TO STRESS THOSE ELEMENTS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THEM, PARTICULARLY THE TOTAL, INDIVISIBLE AND GLOBAL NATURE OF THE PROCESS, THE NEED FOR REAL PROGRESS BOTH AT STATE LEVEL AND AT THE LEVEL OF INDIVIDUALS, AND THE QUESTIONABLE NATURE OF CERTAIN METHODS APPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION IN PURSUING THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE. WESTERN COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, SHOULD AVOID TOO MUCH ATTENTION BEING GIVEN TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF DETENTE AND SHOULD FOCUS ON SPECIFIC ACTIONS.

12. THE BELGRADE MEETINGS WILL NOT BE EASY. THIS FACT UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF CAREFUL PREPARATION AMONG THE ALLIES. THE ALLIES SHOULD ALSO AIM TO ESTABLISH THE SAME CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED WHICH PROVED SO HELPFUL DURING THE HELSINKI/GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WILL HAVE TO BE A TWO-WAY CO-OPERATION AND WILL MEAN SHOWING SOME READINESS TO SUPPORT POSITIONS TO WHICH THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED ATTACH IMPORTANCE.

HANDLING THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AT BELGRADE
13. THE GENERALIZED AND PERFUNCTORY STYLE OF REVIEW

DESIRED BY THE EASTERN COUNTRIES WOULD NOT SEEM IN WESTERN
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INTERESTS. IT WOULD ENTAIL THE RISK OF ACCEPTING, BY IMPLICATION, EASTERN CLAIMS TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION, AND THUS OF GREATLY DIMINISHING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR LEVERAGE WHICH THE FINAL ACT NOW GIVES THE ALLIES. IT WOULD ALSO BE LIKELY TO PROVOKE STRONG CRITICISM FROM WESTERN PUBLIC OPINIONS.

14. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE GENERAL WESTERN APPROACH DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 7 REMAINS VALID AT THE TIME OF BELGRADE, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD INSIST ON THE REVIEW BEING THE CENTRAL TASK OF THE MEETING. SUCH A REVIEW SHOULD COVER THE IMPLEMENTATION BY INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES; IT SHOULD BE FULL, FRANK AND OBJECTIVE, RECOGNIZING PROGRESS WHERE THIS EXISTS BUT ALSO LACK OF PROGRESS WHERE THIS IS THE CASE. WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE PERFORMANCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THOSE OF INDIVIDUAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT ENGAGE IN RECRIMINATION OR SEEK CONFRONTATION, BUT SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR SOME HARSH WORDS FROM THOSE EASTERN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE CRITICIZED.

15. THE REVIEW SHOULD COVER ALL ASPECTS OF THE FINAL ACT. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE ATTENTION FOR THOSE PRINCIPLES (E.G. ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION) AND PROVISIONS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE WEST.

16. THE REVIEW SHOULD STUDY NOT MERELY THE LIST OF NEW IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES SINCE HELSINKI, BUT OVERALL COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT IN EACH SECTOR. THIS SHOULD HELP TO PLACE IN A CORRECT PERSPECTIVE THE COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF EASTERN AND WESTERN COUNTRIES. EASTERN COUNTRIES MIGHT BE ABLE TO POINT TO A LONGER LIST OF NEW MEASURES, BUT THE PRACTICES OF ALLIED COUNTRIES IN MOST RESPECTS HAVE LONG BEEN IN CONFORMITY WITH THE STANDARDS OF THE FINAL ACT. WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT ACCEPT EASTERN CRITICISMS BASED ON CRITERIA WHICH THE WEST REFUSED TO ALLOW INTO THE FINAL ACT, SUCH AS DEMANDS FOR STATISTICAL RECIPROCITY AND FOR GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER INFORMATION MEDIA.

HANDLING OF NEW PROPOSALS AT BELGRADE

17. IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED AND SOME EASTERN COUNTRIES WILL PRESENT NEW PROPOSALS AT BELGRADE:
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(A) TO IMPLEMENT EXISTING PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT;
(B) TO DEVELOP CERTAIN OF THESE PROVISIONS.

18. IN THEORY, IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES

TO ARGUE THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO CONSIDER ANY NEW PROPOSALS. IF SUCH A STAND WERE SUCCESSFUL, IT WOULD AVOID THE DANGERS INHERENT IN NEW PROPOSALS, NAMELY: THEY MIGHT DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE PRIME NEED FOR UNILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT; THEY MIGHT DISTORT THE BALANCE OF THE FINAL ACT, SINCE IT WILL PROVE DIFFICULT TO FIND NEW PROPOSALS ON HUMAN CONTACTS AND INFORMATION ACCEPTABLE TO THE 35; THEY MIGHT REMOVE THE EMPHASIS OF THE BELGRADE MEETINGS FROM THE REVIEW ELEMENT; AND, LASTLY, PROPOSALS TO DEVELOP (RATHER THAN IMPLEMENT) THE FINAL ACT MIGHT WEAKEN THE INTEGRITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE HELSINKI DOCUMENT. THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF REVISING THE FINAL ACT.

19. HOWEVER, A COMPLETELY NEGATIVE POSITION WOULD RANGE THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED AGAINST US AND MAKE THE EASTERN COUNTRIES SEEM POSITIVE BY COMPARISON. MOREOVER, IF WE ARE TO ACCEPT ANY NEW PROPOSALS, IT WOULD SEEM WRONG TO LEAVE THE INITIATIVE ENTIRELY IN THE HANDS OF OTHERS.

20. THESE CONSIDERATIONS SUGGEST THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOW PREPARE SOME INITIATIVES, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREAS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THEM, BUT SHOULD LEAVE OPEN AT PRESENT TO WHAT EXTENT THEY SHOULD BE USED AT BELGRADE. THEY SHOULD ALSO BE READY TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF PROPOSALS FROM OTHERS. THE ALLIES SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THE NEED TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS, AND TO MINIMIZE THE DANGERS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 18. NEW PROPOSALS SHOULD NOT LEAD TO THE CREATION OF INDEPENDENT POST-BELGRADE EXPERTS' GROUPS IN UNDERSIRABLE AREAS.

FURTHER FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS AFTER BELGRADE

21. THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE AT THE BELGRADE MEETING FROM THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED AND ROMANIA FOR DECISIONS REGARDING FURTHER FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS TO BE HELD AFTER BELGRADE. THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED ARE UNLIKELY TO PRESS AT BELGRADE FOR A DECISION TO HOLD A FURTHER FULL CSCE CONFERENCE OR FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT FOLLOW-UP INSTITUTIONS; BUT THEY MIGHT WANT SEVERAL EXPERTS MEETINGS AND CONFIDENTIAL

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AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF REGULAR "BELGRADE-STYLE" MEETINGS. APART FROM THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS, EASTERN COUNTRIES MIGHT PRESS FOR EXPERTS GROUPS IN AREAS FAVOURED BY THEM; BUT THEY WILL PROBABLY VIEW WITH LITTLE ENTHUSIASM A FURTHER "BELGRADE" MEETING. THEY SEEM NOT TO WANT A DECISION TO HOLD ANOTHER CSCE CONFERENCE AT THIS STAGE, BUT IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT THAT THEY MAY KEEP THE DOOR OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING SUCH A CONFERENCE IN THE FUTURE WHEN THEY CONSIDER THE TIME IS RIPE.

22. WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD BE CLEAR ABOUT THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES AND ENDEAVOUR TO BRING THIS WHILE PROCESS UNDER FIRM CONTROL. SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INSTITUTIONALIZATION OR AN OVER-ABUNDANCE OF FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS WHICH DETERMINED THE

ALLIED POSITION AT THE HELSINKI/GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS STILL SEEM VALID(OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVIET INTERFERENCE AND FOR PAN-EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS, THREAT TO THE EEC, DUPLICATION, ETC.). ON THE OTHER HAND, CERTAIN TYPES OF FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS COULD PROVE USEFUL IN PUTTING SUSTAINED PRESSURE ON EASTERN COUNTRIES TO CONTINUE WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT. IT SHOULD BECOME CLEARER WHERE THE WEIGHT OF ADVANTAGE LIES AFTER SOME EXPERIENCE WITH THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS.

23. IT WOULD THEREFORE SEEM ADVISABLE FOR THE ALLIES TO AVOID A COMMITMENT ON FURTHER "BELGRADES" UNTIL THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING, BUT KEEP OPN THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING TO ONE FURTHER SUCH MEETING AFTER A PERIOD OF 2-3 YEARS. AGREEMENT AT BELGRADE ON A FURTHER FULL-SCALE CSCE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE RULED OUT AS BEING PREMATURE.

24. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EXPERTS MEETINGS SEEM SIMILAR TO THOSE DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPHS 17-20 IN THE CASE OF NEW PROPOSALS, PLUS THE ADDITIONAL DANGER THAT THEY MIGHT LEAD TO EXCESSIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION. TWO EXPERTS MEETINGS ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN THE FINAL ACT (ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND ON A "SCIENTIFIC FORUM") AND ONE OR TWO MORE MAY PROVE DESIRABLE, BUT CAUTION IS NEEDED.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF DETENTE

25. EASTERN COUNTRIES WILL NO DOUBT PLACE CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON THEIR WELL KNOWN THEME OF "MILITARY DETENTE", AND SEEK TO GAIN CREDIT FOR THEIR CURRENT DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES
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IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THEY ARE LIKELY TO DISCOURAGE OR OPPOSE ANY DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT. THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED ON THE OTHER HAND, WILL PRESS HARD FOR NEW PROPOSALS ON CBMS AND MAY SEEK A MORE EXPLICIT LINK BETWEEN THE CSCE AND MBFR.

26. THE ALLIES SHOULD STRESS THE NEED FOR PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING A MORE BALANCED AND STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. HOWEVER, THEY SHOULD TRY TO AVOID A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE MBFR, AND OPPOSE ANY EXPLICIT LINK. THE ALLIES SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR AMORE MEANINGFUL POSITION AS REGARDS NEW PROPOSALS IN THIS FIELD, INLCUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKIN INITIATIVES THEMSELVES (BUT SEE THE CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING NEW PROPOSALS IN PARAGRAPHS 17-20). THEY SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHEREEVER POSSIBLE THE GREAT INTEREST OF THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED IN THIS SUBJECT.

MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES AT BELGRADE

27. THE NON-ALIGNED MEDITERREANEAN COUNTRIES HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY INTEND TO PUT FORWARD NEW PROPOSALS RELATING TO THAT AREA AT THE BELGRADE MEETINGS, THOUGH THEIR

CHARACTER AND NUMBER ARE NOT YET KNOWN.

28. THE ALLIES WILL WISH TO ADOPT A GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NON-ALIGNED MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES AND SHOULD SUPPORT THE PRESENCE OF NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES AT THE MAIN MEETING ON THE SAME BASIS AS AT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, AT THE SAME TIME, THE ALLIES SHOULD AVOID THE BELGRADE MEETINGS BEING IMPAIRED BY PROBLEMS AND CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LIE OUTSIDE THE MAINSTREAM OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WESTERN COUNTRIES MIGHT CONSIDER WHETHER TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE IN THIS FIELD.

PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY AT BELGRADE

29. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT WESTERN PUBLIC OPINIONS ARE KEPT PROPERLY INFORMED OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT BELGRADE, THE ALLIES WILL NEED TO PURSUE AN ACTIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY. THIS WILL BE COMPLICATED BY TWO FACTORS. FIRST, THE HELSINKI RULES OF PROCEDURE WILL APPLY MUTATIS MUTANDIS. THESE RULES STATE THAT THE INAUGURAL AND CLOSING

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SESSIONS SHOULD BE OPEN, BUT THAT THE OTHER SESSIONS COULD ONLY BE OPEN IF AGREED BY CONSENSUS. AT BELGRADE THE EASTERN COUNTRIES ARE MOST UNLIKELY TO PERMIT A CONSENSUS FOR EXTENDING PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE PROCEEDINGS BEYOND THE MINIMUM PROVIDED FOR IN THE RULES OF PROCEDURE. SECONDLY, ANY TEXT AGREED BY THE 35 PARTICIPANTS FOR THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IS UNLIKELY TO PRESENT AS FULL A PICTURE AS THE ALLIES WOULD WISH, THOUGH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD DO WHAT THEY CAN TO ENSURE THAT IT PRESENTS AS REASONABLE A PICTURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AS POSSIBLE. THE DOCUMENT COULD HAVE ANY OPENING STATEMENTS ATTACHED AS ANNEXES.

30. IT IS CLEAR THAT THESE SOURCES OF INFORMATION WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF WESTERN PUBLIC OPINIONS. THE ALLIES WILL THEREFORE NEED TO SUPPLEMENT THIS INFORMATION THEMSELVES. IN PARTICULAR, INDIVIDUAL ALLIED DELEGATIONS MAY WISH TO GIVE REGULAR PRESS BRIEFINGS THROUGHOUT THE MEETINGS.

ORGANIZATION OF BELGRADE MEETINGS.

31. THE ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE BELGRADE MEETING ARE DEALT WITH IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE ANNEX. THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS EMERGE.

32. THE ALLIES SHOULD WORK FOR ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETINGS WHICH WILL HELP THEM TO INFLUENCE THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE DIRECTION THEY DESIRE, AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO ENSURE THAT THE REVIEW IS GIVEN PROPER PROMINENCE.

33. IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIES TO KEEP THE PREPARATORY MEETING SHORT AND ORGANIZATIONAL, AND TO RESERVE

MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE FOR THE MAIN MEETING. NEVERTHELESS, THE ALLIES SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR SOME SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION DURING THE PREPARATORY MEETING. THE AGENDA FOR THE LATTER SHOULD BE BRIEF AND SIMPLE AND BE BASED CLOSELY ON THE MANDATE GIVEN IN THE FINAL ACT. THE MAIN MEETING SHOULD PROBABLY CONSIST OF BOTH PLENARY AND COMMITTEES.

34. THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT SHOULD BE CLEARLY OF A LESSER STATUS THAN THE FINAL ACT, AND SHOULD PROBABLY BE ONE AGREED DOCUMENT, PERHAPS WITH ANNEXES.
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ANNEX TO
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I. POSSIBLE NEW PROPOSALS AT BELGRADE

1. THE REPORT (PARAGRAPHS 17-20) SUGGESTS THAT ALLIED AUTHORITIES MIGHT CONSIDER POSSIBLE NEW PROPOSALS WHICH THEY COULD TABLE AT THE BELGRADE MEETINGS, WHILE KEEPING AN OPEN MIND AT PRESENT ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY WILL BE SUED. SOME INITIAL IDEAS HAVE ALREADY EMERGED IN DISCUSSIONS IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THEY ARE LISTED BELOW.

(A) BELGIUM IS CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL TO INSTITUTE A STUDY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS FOR CSCE COUNTRIES;

(B) NORWAY IS CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL ON AIR POLLUTION PROBLEMS, WOULD BE READY TO SUPPORT AN INITIATIVE ON HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS (E.G. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXPERT GROUP ON THE SUBJECT), AND MAY CONSIDER A PROPOSAL ON YOUTH;

(C) THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL MAKE PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS AT BELGRADE REGARDING THE "SCIENTIFIC FORUM" PROVIDED FOR IN THE FINAL ACT;

(D) FOR DEFENSIVE USE BY THE EST, A PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS ON VISAS AND OTHER EXIT DOCUMENTATION MIGHT BE PREPARED;

(E) THE PRIVISIONS IN BASKET III ON TRAVEL FOR PERSONAL OR PROFESSIONAL REASONS MIGHT BE DEVELOPED;

(F) CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO RENEWING THE HELSINKI PROPOSAL ON LINKED TELEVISION PROGRAMMES;

(G) CBMS: LOWERING OF THE CURRENT THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANOEUVRES; INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL DETAILS IN THE NOTIFICATION TEXT; EXTENSION OF THE CURRENT MINIMUM TIMEFRAME FOR NOTIFICATION; ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON CRITERIA AMONG CSCE PARTICIPANTS FOR OBSERVER TREATMENT; UNDERTAKING TO NOTIFY JAOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

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2. HOW THE EASTERN COUNTRIES HANDLE THE BREZHEV PROPOSALS (FOR CONFERENCES ON ENERGY, TRANSPORT AND THE ENVIRONMENT) WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE PLEARNY SESSION IN APRIL. THE GDR HAS INDICATED THAT NO DECISION WOULD BE REQUIRED AT BELGRADE IF AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BEFORE HAND ON A CONFERENCE ON ONE SUBJECT WITHIN THE SOPE OF THE PROPOSALS.

3. IN ADDITION TO A PROCEDURAL DECISION TO CALL AN EXPERTS MEETING ON THE SWISS PROPOSAL ON THE PEACFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (ALREADY ENVISAGED IN THE FINAL ACT), THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED HAVE SHOWN INTEREST MAINLY IN DEVELOPING THE CBM PROVISIONS, AND MAY ALSO TABLE OTHER SECURITY PROPOSALS. THE SWISS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WILL SUGGEST IN BELGRADE THE DATE, PLACE AND AGENDA FOR THE EXPERTS MEETING ON THEIR PROPOSAL, AND THAT THEY WILL SLIGHTLY REVISE THEIR EARLIER DRAFT TREATY. THE NON-ALIGNED MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES ARE EXPECTED TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS ON THE MEDITERRANEAN AND, PERHAPS, ON OTHER POINTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE NON-ALIGNED (THE COLOMBO NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT INVITED "NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN TO CONSULT AMONG THEMSELVES WITH A VIEW TO ARRIVING AT A COMMON POSITION, REFLECTING THE ASPIRATION OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AS A WHOLE, TO BE PRESENTED TO THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN BELGRADE IN 1977"). IN ADDITION, YUGOSLAVIA HAS MENTIONED OTHER POSSIBLE IDEAS, INCLUDING A ERUOPEAN YEAR OF CULTURE.

II. ORGANIZATION OF BELGRADE MEETINGS

(1) BALANCE OF WORK BETWEEN PREPARTORY AND MAIN MEETINGS

4. EASTERN COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO ATTEMPT TO LESSEN THE SUBSTANCE AND PUBLIC IMPACT OF THE MAIN MEETING BY PRESSING FOR THE PREPARTORY MEETING TO GO BEYOND ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS. AT PRESENT THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES SEEM TO HOLD MIXED VIEWS ON THE BALANCE OF WORK BETWEEN THE TWO MEETINGS.

5. IT WOULD SEEM TO BE IN THE WESTERN INTEREST FOR THE PREPARTORY MEETING TO BE SHORT AND TECHNICAL, AND LIMITED TO SUCH ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS AS THE DATE, THE AGENDA AND OTHER MODALITIES; AND FOR THE MAIN MEETING TO DEAL WITH THE

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SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THIS BALANCE OF WORK WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ENSURE A SYSTEMATIC AND DETAILED REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AND TO ATTRACT PUBLICITY TO THE MEETINGS. WHETHER SUCH A BALANCE CAN BE ACHIEVED WILL DEPEND TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT ON THE SUCCESS OF THE ALLIES IN

KEEPING THE AGENDA SHORT AND SIMPLE (SEE (BELOW))

(2) ORGANIZATION OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING

6. IN VIEW OF THEIR DESIRE TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING, WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD AIM AT ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS ALL THE TECHNICAL QUESTIONS FOR THE MAIN MEETING. THEY SHOULD, HOWEVER, LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AD HOC GROUPS TO CARRY OUT SOME SPECIALIZED WORK. AS THE PREPARATORY MEETING IS CONCEIVED AS A TECHNICAL MEETING IT SHOULD BE ATTENDED ONLY BY OFFICIALS. AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING A PAPER DEALING WITH THE PROPOSED AGENDA, MODALITIES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE NECESSARY FOR THE MAIN MEETING WILL HAVE TO BE ELABORATED. WHILE THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT AGREE TO A FIXED TERMINATION DATE, THEY SHOULD AIM AT A TARGET DATE (ALLOWING A SESSION OF ABOUT 4-6 WEEKS) TO BE EXTENDED BY CONSENSUS IF NECESSARY. HOWEVER, ALLIED DELEGATIONS SHOULD BE READY TO STAY FOR AS LONG AS PROVES NECESSARY. THE ALLIES SHOULD HAVE PREPARED THEIR POSITIONS WELL BEFORE 15TH JUNE, 1977, ON THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN BOTH PREPARATORY AND MAIN MEETINGS.

(3) ORGANIZATION OF MAIN MEETING

(A) AGENDA

7. IT WOULD ASSIST WESTERN EFFORTS TO GUIDE THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE DESIRED DIRECTION, IF THE AGENDA WAS SHORT AND SIMPLE AND CLOSELY BASED ON THE FINAL ACT, I.E. LIST THE THREE SUBJECTS MENTIONED IN BASKET IV (REVIEW; DEEPENING OF RELATIONS; FOLLOW-UP), WITH SUB-DIVISIONS LISTING THE BASES (PERHAPS INCLUDING THE MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION) UNDER THE REVIEW ITEM AND, DEPENDING ON THE ATTITUDE OF WESTERN COUNTRIES TO NEW PROPOSALS, UNDER THE DEEPENING OF RELATIONS ITEM. THE AGENDA SHOULD NOT LIST INDIVIDUAL NEW PROPOSALS.

(B) PLENARY/COMMITTEES

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8. THREE ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES NEED TO BE CONSIDERED: CONSECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS IN PLENARY; SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDINGS IN COMMITTEES; AND A MIXTURE OF THE TWO. GIVEN THE ALLIED INTEREST IN A THOROUGH AND DETAILED DISCUSSION, THE BEST STRUCTURE MIGHT BE A MIXTURE OF PLENARY (ESPECIALLY FOR THE OPENING AND CLOSING STATEMENTS) AND COMMITTEES (ESPECIALLY FOR NEW PROPOSALS). THE REVIEW ITEM MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN PLENARY, SUPPLEMENTED, IF THIS PROVED DESIRABLE, BY DISCUSSION IN COMMITTEE(S). COMMITTEES MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED ON BASKETS I, II AND III, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER GROUPS IF NEEDED. IT MAY BE ADVISABLE TO MAKE A CLEAR OVERALL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE REVIEW ITEM STAGE AND DEEPENING OF RELATIONS ITEM STAGE OF THE MEETING, SO THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES CAN ENSURE A SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF THE FORMER ITEM BEFORE PASSING TO THE LATTER.

9. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE MAIN MEETING MIGHT BEGIN WITH A ROUND OF OPENING STATEMENTS. A MORE DETAILED STUDY OF FIRST THE REVIEW, AND THEN NEW PROPOSALS AND FURTHER FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS, WOULD FOLLOW EITHER IN PLENARY OR IN COMMITTEES. AS REGARDS THE REVIEW, A POSSIBLE LINE OF PRESENTATION BY ALLIED DELEGATES MIGHT BE: A REVIEW OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS; A DESCRIPTION OF ONE'S OWN COUNTRY'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT IN THE CONTEXT OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY; WHAT IMPLEMENTATION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED WITH REGARD TO OTHER INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND WHAT HAD BEEN THE GAPS AND OBSTACLES.

(C) OPENING DATE AND DURATION

10. THE OPENING DATE OF THE MAIN MEETING WILL NECESSARILY DEPEND ON THE DURATION OF THE PREPARATORY SESSION. BUT IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE MEETING MIGHT BEGIN EARLY IN OCTOBER.

11. THE EASTERN COUNTRIES (APART FROM ROMANIA) CLEARLY DESIRE THAT THE MAIN MEETING SHOULD BE KEPT AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WEST WILL WISH THE MEETING TO BE LONG ENOUGH FOR THE THOROUGH APPROACH THEY DESIRE. TOO PROTRACTED A MEETING, HOWEVER, MIGHT PRESENT THE DANGER OF (A) INCREASED POLEMICS AND MIGHT THUS HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND OF (B) ENCOURAGING TOO MANY NEW PROPOSALS, DISTRACTING ATTENTION FROM THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT. THE MEETING IS LIKELY TO LAST UNTIL THE END OF 1977, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND COULD PERHAPS GO OVER INTO THE FOLLOWING YEAR. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER TO WORK FOR (A) A FIXED TERMINATION DATE, SUBJECT TO PROLONGATION BY CONSENSUS, (B) AN OPENING DATE, WITH TERMINATION BY CONSENSUS OR (C) A TARGET DATE, COMBINED WITH A CONSENSUS REQUIREMENT AS IN EITHER (A) OR (B).

(D) LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION

12. WHILE ALL THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES ARE PLANNING TO BE REPRESENTED THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE BELGRADE MEETINGS AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL, SOME ARE CONSIDERING POLITICAL REPRESENTATION (JUNIOR MINISTER) FOR THE OPENING AND CONCLUDING SESSIONS OF THE MAIN MEETING. SOME VARIATION DOES NOT SEEM TO MATTER.

III. POSSIBLE PROPOSAL FOR A PRE-BELGRADE MEETING

13. THE SOVIET UNION HAS INFORMALLY SUGGESTED THAT THE 35 PARTICIPANTS MIGHT HOLD A MEETING AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL BEFORE THE PREPARATORY MEETING. THIS WOULD SEEK TO BE NEITHER NECESSARY NOR IN THE INTERESTS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES, AND SHOULD BE OPPOSED. STRAUZE-HUPE UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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